We consider a finite time horizon multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem in a Bayesian framework, for which we develop a general set of control policies that leverage ideas from information relaxations of stochastic dynamic optimization problems. In crude terms, an information relaxation allows the decision maker (DM) to have access to the future (unknown) rewards and incorporate them in her optimization problem to pick an action at time t, but penalizes the decision maker for using this information. In our setting, the future rewards allow the DM to better estimate the unknown mean reward parameters of the multiple arms, and optimize her sequence of actions. By picking different information penalties, the DM can construct a family of policies of increasing complexity that, for example, include Thompson Sampling and the true optimal (but intractable) policy as special cases.
Introduction
Dating back to the earliest work (Bradt et al., 1956; Gittins, 1979) , multi-armed bandit (MAB) problems have been considered within a Bayesian framework, in which the unknown parameters are modeled as random variables drawn from a known prior distribution. In this setting, the problem can be viewed as a Markov decision process (MDP) with state that is an information state describing the beliefs of unknown parameters that evolves stochastically upon each play of an arm according to Bayes' rule. Under the objective of expected performance, where the expectation is taken with re-spect to the prior distribution over unknown parameters, the (Bayesian) optimal policy is characterized by Bellman equations immediately following from the MDP formulation. In the discounted infinite-horizon setting, the celebrated Gittins index (Gittins, 1979) determines an optimal policy, despite the fact that its computation is still challenging. In the non-discounted finite-horizon setting, which we consider, the problem becomes more difficult (Berry and Fristedt, 1985) , and except for some special cases, the Bellman equations are neither analytically nor numerically tractable, due to the curse of dimensionality. In this paper, we focus on the determination of the optimal policy (Opt) as an ideal goal that can be tackled by dynamic programming (DP).
We introduce the information relaxation framework (Brown et al., 2010 ), a recently developed technique that provides a systemic way of obtaining the performance bounds on the optimal policy. It is common in multi-period stochastic DP problems to consider admissible policies that are required to make decisions based only on the previously revealed information. In our framework, we consider the non-anticipativity as a constraint imposed on the policy space that can be relaxed, as in a usual Lagrangian relaxation. Under such a relaxation, the decision maker (DM) is allowed to access to the future information and is asked to solve an optimization problem so as to maximize her total reward, in the presence penalties that punish the violation of the non-anticipativity. When the penalties satisfy a condition (dual feasibility, formally defined in §3), the expected value of maximal reward adjusted by the penalties provides an upper bound of the expected performance of the (non-anticipating) optimal policy.
The idea of relaxing the non-anticipativity constraint has been studied over time in the different contexts (Rockafellar and Wets, 1991; Davis and Karatzas, 1994; Rogers, 2002; Haugh and Kogan, 2004) , and later formulated as a formal framework by Brown et al. (2010) , upon which our methodology is developed. This framework has been applied across a variety of applications including optimal stopping problems (Desai et al., 2012) , linearquadratic control (Haugh and Lim, 2012) , dynamic portfolio execution (Haugh and Wang, 2014) and others (see Brown and Haugh (2017) ).
Our contribution is to apply the information relaxation techniques to the finite-horizon stochastic MAB problem exploiting the structures of Bayesian learning process. In particular:
1. we propose a series of information relaxations and penalties with increasing complexity; 2. we systematically obtain the upper bounds on the best achievable expected performance that are in trade-off between tightness and computational complexity;
3. and, we obtain the associated (randomized) policies that generalize Thompson Sampling (TS) in the finite-horizon setting.
In our framework, which we call information relaxation sampling, each of penalty functions (and information relaxations) determines one policy and one performance bound given a particular problem instance specified by the time horizon and prior belief. As a base case for our algorithms, we have TS (Thompson, 1933) and the conventional regret benchmark that has been popularized for Bayesian regret analysis since Lai and Robbins (1985) . On the other extreme, the optimal policy Opt and its expected performance follow from the "ideal" penalty which is intractable to specify. By picking increasingly strict information penalties, we can improve the policy and the associated bound between the two extremes of TS and Opt.
As an illustrating example, one of our algorithms, Irs.FH, provides a very simple modification of TS that takes into account the length of the time horizon T . Recalling that TS makes a decision based on sampled parameters from the posterior distribution in each epoch, we focus on the fact that knowing the parameters is as informative as having an infinite number of future reward observations in terms of the best arm identification. We let the policy, say π Irs.FH , to make a decision based on the future Bayesian estimates, updated with only T − 1 future reward realizations for each arm, where the rewards are randomly generated based on the posterior belief at the moment. When T = 1 (equivalently, at the last decision epoch), such a policy takes a myopically best action based only on the current estimates, which is indeed an optimal decision, whereas TS would still explore unnecessarily. While keeping the recursive structure in the sequential decision making process of TS, it naturally performs less exploration than TS as the remaining time horizon diminishes.
Beyond this, we propose other algorithms that more explicitly quantify the benefit of exploration and more explicitly trade-off exploration versus exploitation, at the cost of additional computational complexity. As we increase complexity, we achieve policies that improve performance, and separately provide tighter tractable computational upper bounds on the expected performance of any policy for a particular problem instance.
Notation and Preliminaries
Problem. We consider a classical stochastic MAB problem with K independent arms and finite-horizon T . At each decision epoch t = 1, · · · , T , the decision maker (DM) pulls an arm a t ∈ A {1, · · · , K} and earns a stochastic reward associated with arm a t . More formally, the reward from n th pull of arm a is denoted by R a,n which is independently drawn from unknown distribution R a (θ a ), where θ a ∈ Θ a is the parameter associated with arm a. We also have a prior distribution P a (y a ) over unknown parameter θ a , where y a ∈ Y a , which we call belief, is a hyperparameter describing the prior distribution:
We define two mean reward functions
as a function of unknown parameter θ a and prior belief y a respectively. Through out the paper, we assume that the rewards are absolutely integrable over the prior distribution: i.e., E [|R a,n |] < ∞ or more explicitly, E θa∼Pa(ya),r∼Ra (θa) [|r|] < ∞ for all a ∈ A.
For brevity, we denote θ (θ 1 , · · · , θ K ) ∈ Θ and y (y 1 , · · · , y K ) ∈ Y be the vector of parameters and beliefs across arms, respectively. We additionally define an outcome ω as a combination of the parameters and all future reward realizations that incorporates all uncertainties in the environment that the DM encounters:
where I(T, y) represents the distribution of outcome.
Policy. Given an action sequence up to time t, a 1: Let a π 1:t be the action sequence taken by a policy π. The (Bayesian) performance of a policy π is defined as the expected total reward over the randomness associated with the outcome, i.e.,
A policy π is called non-anticipating if its every action a π t is F t−1 -measurable, and we define Π F be a set of all non-anticipating policies, including randomized ones.
MDP formulation.
We assume that we are equipped with a Bayesian update function U a : Y a × R → Y a so that after observing R a,1 = r from an arm a, the belief is updated from y a to U a (y a , r) according to Bayes' rule. We will often use U : Y × A × R → Y to describe the updating of the entire belief vector y; i.e., after observing R a,1 = r from some arm a, the belief vector is updated from y to U(y, a, r) where only the a th component is updated in this step.
In a Bayesian framework, the MAB problem has a recursive structure. Given a time horizon T and prior belief y, suppose the DM had just earned r by pulling an arm a at time t = 1. The remaining problem for the DM is equivalent to a problem with time horizon T − 1 and prior belief U(y, a, r). We further know the (unconditional) distribution of what the DM will observe when pulling an arm a, a doubly stochastic random variable, and we denote it by R a (P a (y a )). Following from this Markovian structure, we obtain the Bellman equations for the MAB problem:
with V * (0, y) 0 for all y ∈ Y. While the Bellman equation is intractable to analyze, it offers a characterization of the Bayesian optimal policy (Opt) and the best achievable performance V * : i.e., V * (T, y) = V (Opt, T, y) = sup π∈Π F V (π, T, y).
Information Relaxation Sampling
We propose a general framework, which we refer to as information relaxation sampling (IRS), that takes as an input a 'penalty function', and produces as outputs a policy and an associated performance bound.
Information relaxation penalties and inner problem. If we relax the nonanticipativity constraint imposed on policy space Π F (i.e., a π t is F t−1 -measurable), the DM will be allowed to first observe all future outcomes in advance, and then pick an action (i.e., a π t is σ(ω)-measurable). To compensate for this relaxation, we impose a penalty on the DM for violating the nonanticipativity constraint.
We introduce a penalty function z t (a 1:t ; ω, T, y) to denote the penalty that the DM incurs at time t, when taking an action sequence a 1:t given a particular instance specified by ω, T and y. The clairvoyant DM can find the best action sequence that is optimal for a particular outcome ω in the presence of penalties z t , by solving the following (deterministic) optimization problem, referred as the inner problem:
To clarify the notion of conditional expectation, we remark that the penalty function z t (·; ω, T, y) is a stochastic function of the action sequence a 1:t since the outcome ω is random.
1 The dual feasibility condition requires that the DM who makes decisions on the natural filtration will receive zero penalties in expectation.
IRS performance bound. Let W z (T, y) be the expected maximal value of the inner problem ( * ), when the outcome ω is randomly drawn from its prior distribution I(T, y), i.e., the expected total payoff that a clairvoyant DM can achieve in the presence of penalties:
We can obtain this value numerically via simulation: draw outcomes
independently from I(T, y), solve the inner problem for each outcome separately, and then take the average of the maximal value over samples. 
The ideal penalty function z ideal t has a following functional form:
Recall that a dual feasible penalty function does not penalize (in expectation) nonanticipating policies, which include Opt. Even when the future information is available, the DM can earn V * under the penalties by implementing Opt without taking advantage of future information. When she makes use of future information, she can always outperform Opt, which leads to the weak duality result. The ideal penalty z ideal t precisely penalizes for the additional profit extracted from using the future information, therefore removing any incentive to deviate from Opt and resulting in the strong duality.
The ideal penalty is, of course, intractable, but its structure tells us what a good penalty may look like. It implies that there are two sources of additional profit: in DP terminology, one from knowing future immediate rewards and one from knowing future state transitions, each of which will be taken into account later in this paper. As another implication, it shows that relaxing more the available information can always be compensated by adding associated terms in the penalty function. Hence, it is sufficient to consider the full-information relaxation (i.e., a π t is σ(ω)-measurable), as we do in this paper, in a sense that a partialinformation relaxation (e.g., a π t is measurable w.r.t.
is equivalent to the setting with the full relaxation and a more complicated penalty function. Under the full-information relaxation, the actual amount of information available for the DM can be equivalently controlled by adjusting the penalty function.
IRS policy. Given a penalty function z t , we characterize an IRS, possibly randomized, policy π z ∈ Π F as follows. The policy π z specifies 'which arm to pull when the remaining time is T and current belief is y'. Given T and y, (i) it first samples the outcomeω from I(T, y) randomly, (ii) solves the inner problem to find a best action sequenceã repeated at every decision epoch, while updating the remaining time T and belief y. Procedure IRS-Outer(T, y; z)
Earn and observe a reward r t and update belief y t ← U(y t−1 , a t , r t ) end
In step (i), samplingω ∼ I(T, y) means sampling the parametersθ a ∼ P a (y a ) and then generating the future rewardsR a,n ∼ R a (θ a ) for all n ∈ [T ] and all a ∈ A. It is equivalent to simulating a plausible future scenario based on the current belief y, and π z takes the best action optimized to this synthesized future. Note that only the first actionã * 1 out of the optimal solutionã * 1:T is utilized, and at the following decision epoch a new outcome is sampled from the updated posterior. For a MAB problem with time horizon T , in total, it solves T different instances of the inner problem throughout the entire decision process. Remark 1. The ideal penalty yields the Bayesian optimal policy: i.e., V (π ideal , T, y) = V * (T, y).
Choice of penalty functions. IRS policies include Thompson Sampling and the Bayesian optimal policy as two extremal cases. We propose a set of penalty functions spanning these two. While deferring the detailed explanations in §3.1 - §3.3, we briefly list the penalty functions:
where y t (a 1:t ; ω) represents the posterior belief at time t as used in IRS-Outer in Algorithm 1. To help understanding, we provide an identity as an example: (10)- (14). TS refers to Thompson sampling and Opt refers to the Bayesian optimal policy. Run time represents the time complexity of solving one instance of inner problem, representing the time required to obtain one sample of performance bound or to make a single decision in policy. Table 1 summarizes our algorithms investigated in this paper. We derive a variety of penalty designs by exploiting the structures in the causal process of a Bayesian learner. As we sequentially increase its complexity, from z TS to z ideal , the penalty function more accurately penalizes the benefit of knowing the future outcomes, more explicitly preventing the DM from exploiting the future information. It makes the inner problem closer to the original stochastic optimization problem that results in a better performing policy and a tighter performance bound. As a result, we achieve a family of algorithms that are intuitive and tractable, exhibiting a trade-off between quality and computational efficiency.
Thompson Sampling
With the penalty function z TS t (a 1:t ; ω) r t (a 1:t ; ω) − µ at (θ at ), the inner problem ( * ) reduces to max
Given an outcome ω, in the presence of penalties, a hindsight optimal action sequence is to keep pulling one arm a * 1 = argmax a µ a (θ a ), T times in a row. The resulting performance bound is equivalent to the conventional regret benchmark, i.e.,
which measures how much the DM could have achieved if the parameters are revealed in advance. The corresponding IRS policy π TS is equivalent to Thompson Sampling: when the sampled outcomeω is used instead, it pulls the arm argmax a µ a (θ a ) where eachθ a ∼ P a (y a ), and this sampling-based decision making is repeated at each epoch, while updating the belief sequentially, as described in IRS-Outer in Algorithm 1.
Note that the optimal solution is determined by the parameters θ only -it does not need to consider the future rewards, and thus it takes O(K) computations to make a single decision in policy or to obtain a single sample of performance bound.
IRS.FH
Let µ a,T −1 (ω) be the expected mean reward of an arm a inferred from T −1 reward realizations R a,1 , · · · , R a,T −1 . Given (12), the optimal solution to the inner problem ( * ) is to pull an arm with the highest µ a,T −1 (ω) from beginning to the end:
Irs.FH is almost identical to TS except that µ a (θ a ) is replaced with µ a,T −1 (ω). Note that µ a,T −1 (ω) is less informative than µ a (θ a ) from the DM's perspective, since she will never be able to learn µ a (θ a ) perfectly within a finite horizon. In terms of mean reward estimation, knowing the parameters is equivalent to having the infinite number of observations. The inner problem of TS asks the DM to "identify the best arm based on the infinite number of samples" whereas that of Irs.FH asks her to "identify the best arm based on the finite number of samples", which takes into account the length of time horizon explicitly.
Focusing on the randomness of µ a (θ a ) and µ a,T −1 (ω), we observe that the distribution of µ a,T −1 (ω) will be more concentrated around its meanμ a (y a ). Following from Jensen's inequality, we have W Irs.FH ≤ W TS for any problem instance, saying that Irs.FH yields a performance bound tighter than the conventional benchmark. In terms of policy, the variance of µ a,T −1 (ω) (and µ a (θ a )) also governs the degree of random exploration, deviating from the myopic decision of pulling an arm with the largestμ a (y a ). When it approaches the end of the horizon (T 1), π Irs.FH naturally explores less than TS.
Sampling µ a,T −1 (ω) at once. In order to obtain µ a,T −1 (ω) for a synthesized outcomeω, one may apply Bayes' rule sequentially for each reward realization, which will take O(KT ) computations in total. It can be done in O(K) if the prior distribution P a is a conjugate prior of the reward distribution R a , in which the belief can be updated in a batch by the use of sufficient statistics of observations. In the case of the Beta-Bernoulli MAB or the Gaussian MAB, for example, µ a,T −1 (ω) can be represented as a convex combination of the current estimateμ a (y a ) and the sample mean
n=1R a,n−1 . We further know that the distribution of T −1 n=1R a,n−1 is Binomial(T − 1,θ a ) for the Beta-Bernoulli case, and N ((T −1)·θ a , (T −1)·σ 2 a ) for the Gaussian case, where σ 2 a represents the noise variance. After sampling the parameterθ a , we can sample
n=1R a,n−1 directly from the known distribution, and use it to compute µ a,T −1 (ω) without sequentially updating the belief. In such cases, a single decision of π Irs.FH can be made within O(K) operations, similar in complexity to TS.
IRS.V-Zero and IRS.V-EMax
IRS.V-Zero. Let µ a,n (ω) be the expected mean reward of arm a inferred from the first n reward realizations:
Under this penalty, the DM earns µ a,n−1 (ω) from the n th pull of an arm a: for example, if a 1:T = (1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1), the total payoff is µ 1,0 + µ 2,0 + µ 2,1 + µ 2,2 + µ 2,3 + µ 1,1 .
Given an outcome ω, the total payoff is determined only by the total number of pulls of each arm, and not the sequence in which the arms had been pulled. Therefore, solving the inner problem ( * ) is equivalent to "finding the optimal allocation (n * 1 , n * 2 , · · · , n * K ) among T remaining opportunities": omitting ω for brevity, the inner problem reduces to max
where S a,n n m=1 µ a,m−1 is the cumulative payoff from the first n pulls of an arm a, and
N a=1 n a = T } is the set of all feasible allocations. Once the S a,n 's are computed, this inner problem can be solved within O(KT 2 ) operations by sequentially applying sup convolution K times. The detailed implementation is provided in §A.1.
Given an optimal allocationñ * , the policy π Irs.V-Zero needs to select which arm to pull next. In principle, any arm a that was included in the solution of the inner problem,ñ * a > 0, would be fine, but we suggest a selection rule in which the arm that needs most pulls is chosen, i.e., argmax añ * a . It guarantees π
Irs.V-Zero to behave like TS when T is large, as formally stated in Proposition 1.
IRS.V-EMax.
Irs.V-EMax includes an additional cost for using the information of future belief transitions. Compared to the ideal penalty z ideal t (10), z Irs.V-EMax t (14) is obtained by replacing the true value function V * (T, y) with W TS (T, y) (16), as a tractable approximation. The use of W TS leads to a simple expression for the conditional expectation with respect to the natural filtration. Since θ|F t−1 is distributed with P(y t−1 ), we have
We observe that, given ω, the future belief y t (a 1:t ; ω) is completely determined by how many times each arm had been pulled, irrespective of the sequence of the pulls. For example, consider two action sequences a A 1:t = (1, 1, 2, 1, 2) and a B 1:t = (2, 1, 1, 2, 1). Even though the order of observations would differ, the agent will observe (R 1,1 , R 1,2 , R 1,3 ) from arm 1 and (R 2,1 , R 2,2 ) from arm 2 in both cases that end up with the same belief y t (a
Following from the observation above, the state (belief) space can be efficiently parameterized with the pull counts n 1:K = (n 1 , · · · , n K ) instead of action sequence a 1:t . Since the total number of possible future beliefs is IRS.Index policy. Finally, we propose Irs.Index, which does not strictly belong to the IRS framework, and does not produce a performance bound, but it exhibits strong empirical performance.
Roughly speaking, Irs.Index approximates the finite-horizon Gittins index (Kaufmann et al., 2012) using Irs.V-EMax. For each arm in isolation, it internally solves the singlearmed bandit problem in which there is a competing outside option that yields a deterministic (known) reward. Applying Irs.V-EMax to a single-armed bandit problem, we can find if the stochastic arm is worth trying against a particular value of outside option in O(KT ). The threshold value that makes the arm barely worth trying can be obtained by binary search, repeatedly solving the singe-armed bandit problems while varying the value of outside option. The policy π Irs.Index plays an arm with the largest threshold value. See §A.3.
Analysis
Remark 3 (Optimality at the end). 
Similarly, so does Irs.V-Zero 2 :
TS, Irs.FH(T, y) and Irs.V-Zero(T, y) denote the action taken by policies π TS , π
Irs.FH and π Irs.V-Zero , repsectively, when the remaining time is T and the prior belief is y. These are random variables, since each of these policies uses a randomly sampled outcomeω on its own.
Remark 3 and Proposition 1 state that Irs.FH and Irs.V-Zero behave like TS during the initial decision epochs, gradually shift toward the myopic scheme and end up with optimal decision; in contrast, TS will continue to explore throughout. The transition from exploration to exploitation under these IRS policies occurs smoothly, without relying on an auxiliary control parameter. While maintaining their recursive structure, IRS policies take into account the horizon T , and naturally balance exploitation and exploration. Theorem 2 (Monotonicity in performance bounds). Irs.FH and Irs.V-Zero monotonically improve the performance bound:
Note that We interpret that the tightness of performance bound W z − V * reflects the degree of optimism that each algorithm would possess. Recall that W z is the expected value of the best possible payoff when the agent is informed with some future outcomes in advance. The weak duality W z ≥ V * implies that IRS algorithms are basically optimistic in a sense that the agent would believe that she can earn more than the optimal policy in a hope that the additional information is true. Even with the same outcome ω, depending on the penalties z t , the agent would have different anticipation about the future payoff. As we incorporate the actual learning process, the agent's anticipation becomes less optimistic and the performance bound gets tighter.
We define the 'suboptimality gap' of an IRS policy π z to be W z (T, y) − V (π z , T, y), and analyze it instead of the conventional (Bayesian) regret, W TS (T, y) − V (π z , T, y). While its non-negativity is guaranteed from weak duality (Theorem 1), more desirably, the optimal policy yields a zero suboptimality gap (Theorem 1 & Remark 1). It coincides with the conventional regret measure only for TS. Theorem 3 (Suboptimality gap). For the Beta-Bernoulli MAB, for any T and y,
We do not have a theoretical guarantee for monotonicity in the actual performance V (π z , T, y) among IRS policies. Instead, Theorem 3 indirectly shows the improvements in suboptmality: although all the bounds have the same asymptotic order of O( √ KT log T ), 3 the IRS policies improve the leading coefficient or the additional term.
The proof of Theorem 3, provided in C.4, relies on an interesting property of IRS policies, which is a generalization of TS. Russo and Van Roy (2014) observed that TS is randomized in a way that, conditional on the past observations, the probability of choosing an action a equals to the probability that the action a is chosen by someone who knows the parameters. Analogously, the IRS policy π z is randomized in a way that, conditional on the past observations and the past actions, the probability of choosing an action a matches the probability that the action a is chosen by someone who knows the entire future but penalized (see Proposition 7). Recall that the penalties are designed to penalize the gain of having additional future information. A better choice of penalty function prevents the policy π z from picking up an action that is overly optimized to a randomly sampled future realization, which in turn improves the quality of the decision making.
3 Bubeck and Liu (2013) had shown that the Bayesian regret of TS is bounded by 14 √ KT when the rewards have a bounded support in [0, 1] including Beta-Bernoulli MAB. Despite of its lower asymptotic order, however, the actual number given in (23) is tighter than 14 √ KT for small T . As a side note, Lai (1987) showed that the Bayesian regret of the optimal policy has an asymptotic lower bound of O(log 2 T ).
Numerical Experiments
We visualize the effectiveness of IRS policies and performance bounds in case of Gaussian MAB with five arms (K = 5) with different noise variances. More specifically, each arm a ∈ A has the unknown mean reward θ a ∼ N (0, 1 2 ) and yields the stochastic rewards R a,n ∼ N (θ a , σ (T, y) ) that are measured at the different values of T = 5, 10, · · · , 500. Note that lower regret curves are better, and higher bound curves are better. Also, the regret bound produced by TS is zero, since W TS (T, y) is the benchmark (16) used in this regret plot.
We first observe a clear improvement in both performances and bounds as we incorporate more complicated penalty functions from TS to Irs.V-Zero. As stated in Theorem 2, the monotonicity in the bound curves can be observed. The suboptimality gap (the gap between a regret curve and its corresponding bound curve) gets tightened, which is consistent with the implication of Theorem 3. As a trade-off, however, it requires a longer running time.
In this particular example, it is crucial to incorporate how much we can learn about each of the arms during the remaining time periods, which heavily depends on the noise level σ a .
4 Comparing Irs.FH with TS, as a simple modification for finite-horizon setting, the performance has improved significantly without degrading its computational efficiency. We also observe that IRS policies and IDS outperform to Bayes-UCB, OGI and TS algorithms, since they explicitly incorporate the value of exploration -how quickly the posterior distribution will be concentrated upon each observation.
This example also illustrates us the significance of having a tighter performance bound.
Benchmarking to W
Irs.V-Zero , when T = 500, Irs.Index* policy achieves 94% = 
A. Algorithms in Detail
A.
Implementation of IRS.V-Zero
We provide a pseudo-code of π Irs.V-Zero introduced in §3.3. The same logic can be directly used to compute the performance bound W Irs.V-Zero if the sampled outcomeω is replaced with the true outcome ω. 
A.2. Implementation of IRS.V-EMax
Given the penalty function z
Irs.V-EMax t defined in (14), we define the payoff of pulling an arm a one more time after pulling each arm a , n a times: with n 1:
where e a ∈ Z K is a basis vector such that a th component is one and the others are zero. Note that we used the fact that E W TS (T − t, y t ) F t−1 = W TS (T − t, y t−1 ). We also use the notation of y t (n 1:K ; ω) to denote the belief as a function of pull counts n 1:K , based on the observation that the belief is completely determined by how many times each arm was pulled, n 1:K , no matter in what order they were pulled.
Consider a subproblem of ( * ) such that maximizes the total payoff given the number of pulls n 1:K across arm:
Then, it should satisfy
For all feasible counts n 1:K 's such that K a=1 n a ≤ T , we can compute M (n 1:K ; ω)'s by sequentially solving (28) in an appropriate order. After all, we can obtain the maximal value to original inner problem ( * ) by evaluating max
The optimal action sequence a * 1:T can be elicited by tracking M (n 1:K , ω)'s backward.
Algorithm 3: Irs.V-EMax policy Function Irs.V-EMax(T, y)

1
Sample an outcomeω ∼ I(T, y)
Here,ỹ(n 1:K ) (ỹ 1,n 1 , · · · ,ỹ K,n K ), N ≤T {n 1:K ; a n a ≤ T }, N <T {n 1:K ; a n a < T }, and in line 8, n 1:K iterates over N ≤T \ {0} in an order that K a=1 n a is non-decreasing.
However, another practical issue is the cost of computing W TS (T, y) = T × E θ∼P(y) [max a µ a (θ a )] which has to be evaluated O(T K ) times in total. In general, there is no simple closed form expression in general, and it should be evaluated with numerical integration or sampling.
A.3. IRS.Index Policy
Single-armed bandit problem. Consider a problem with a single arm a that yields stochastic rewards R a,n ∼ R a (θ a ) and with an outside option that yields a deterministic reward λ. We have a prior distribution P a (y a ) over unknown parameter θ a whereas the deterministic reward λ is known apriori.
Given an outcome ω, we have the future belief trajectory (y a,n ) n∈{0,··· ,T } where y a,n is the belief after observing first n rewards.
We adopt the penalty function z
Irs.V-EMax t in which the true value function
such that a t = 1 if pulling the stochastic arm and a t = 0 if choosing the outside option at time t. The associated inner problem is
where µ a,n μ a (y a,n ) and
Proposition 2. The optimization problem (31) can be reformulated as
Here, the decision variable n is the total number of pulls of stochastic arm.
where t n inf{t; n t ≥ n}. It suffices to find (t 1 , · · · , t m ) with 1
In order to minimize (39), we need to set t n * +1 − t n * = T − m + 1 for n * argmin 0≤n≤m Γ λ n and t n+1 − t n = 1 for n = n * . For such t n 's, (35) reduces to
By taking its maximum value over m = 0, · · · , T , we obtain (34).
Let ϕ a (λ) be the (maximal) relative benefit of pulling the stochastic arm against not pulling.
Note that max was taken over n ≥ 1. We interpret that, given the future belief trajectory (y a,n ) n∈{0,··· ,T } , the stochastic arm is worth trying against the deterministic reward λ if ϕ a (λ) ≥ 0 and not worth trying if ϕ a (λ) < 0.
The value of ϕ a (λ) can be computed in O(T ) operations by precalculating 
where F 
11
Index policy. We now return to the original MAB problem with K arms. Recall that the single-arm bandit algorithm tells us whether an arm (given a sampled future) is worth trying against the deterministic reward λ. We use the algorithm as a module to compute the index of each arm.
More specifically, for each arm a = 1, · · · , K seperately, Irs.Index policy samples the future belief trajectory {ỹ a,n } n∈{0,··· ,T } and finds a threshold deterministic reward that makes the arm barely worth trying:λ * a
Although the monotonicity ofφ a (·) is not theoretically proven, we observe that the binary search works well in our numerical experiments. Some numerical experiment include a heuristic variation of index policy, Irs.Index*, that is obtained by using
instead of (42).
B. Proofs for §3 Proposition 3 (Mean equivalence). If the penalty function z t is dual feasible, it does not penalize any non-anticipating policy
Proof. We define an appending operator ⊕ that concatenates an element into a vector such that a 1:t ≡ a 1:t−1 ⊕ a t . When π ∈ Π F and z t is dual feasible, omitting ω for brevity,
B.1. Proof of Theorem 1
Week duality. Define G t F t ∪σ(ω) and consider a relaxed policy space
Strong duality. Fix T and y. Let V in t (a 1:t−1 ; ω) and Q in t (a 1:t−1 , a; ω) be the value function and Q-value function associated with the inner problem ( * ) given a particular outcome ω under the ideal penalty (10). With V in T +1 ≡ 0, we have the Bellman equations for the inner problem:
We argue by induction to show that
for all a 1:t−1 ∈ A t−1 , a ∈ A and t ∈ [T ].
As a terminal case, when t = T + 1, the claim holds trivially, since
). Now assume that the claim holds for t + 1:
t . For any a 1:t−1 ∈ A t−1 and a ∈ A, then,
where the last equality follows from the original Bellman equation (4). Consequently,
Therefore the claim holds for all t = 1, · · · , T . In particular for t = 1, we have
Note that the maximal value of inner problem does not depend on ω -deterministic with respect to the randomness of ω. As its expected value, W ideal (T, y) = V * (T, y).
B.2. Proof of Remark 1
We continue on the proof of strong duality. π ideal solves the same inner problem with respect to a randomly sampled outcomeω. When the remaining time is T and the current belief is y, it takes an action with the largest Q-value: together with (61),
Therefore, at each moment, no matter whatω is chosen, the policy π ideal always takes the same action that Bayesian optimal policy would choose. Although there might be some ambiguity regarding tie-breaking in argmax, it does not affect the expected performance. Therefore, V (π ideal , T, y) = V * (T, y).
B.3. Proof of Remark 2
Except z
Irs.FH t
, all the other penalty functions have a form of
and thus E z 
C. Proofs for §4
Within this section, without loss of generality, we redefine the outcome ω to include an infinite number of future reward realizations:
The original definition of outcome (2) can be thought as a truncated version of (63), in which only the first T reward realizations are adopted for each arm. Although ω does not contain θ, having an infinite number of rewards is sufficient since µ a (θ a ) = lim n→∞
With this new definition, we can describe the distribution of outcome irrespectively of T and we denote it with I(y) (one can imagine I(∞, y) with respect to the original definition).
C.1. Notes on Regularity
Proof. By Jensen's inequality,
Consequently,
Proof. Fix a and let H n σ (R a,1 , · · · , R a,n ). First note that, by SLLN, lim n→∞
C.2. Proof of Proposition 1
Asymptotic behavior of Irs.FH. Letω be the sampled outcome used inside of Irs.FH(T, y). Following from Proposition 5, we have lim n→∞ µ a,n (ω) = µ a (θ a ) for almost allω. Together with the assumption that µ i (θ i ) = µ j (θ j ) for i = j, since argmax a µ a (θ a ) is uniquely defined for almost allω, we have
Since the almost sure convergence guarantees the convergence in distribution, for any a,
Note that we are not particularly assuming that Irs.FH(T, y) and TS(y) share the randomness. The sampled parameters used in TS(y) may not be necessarily same to that of Irs.FH(T, y), but their distribution is identical since they are given the same prior.
Asymptotic behavior of Irs.V-Zero. We dropω for brevity in what follows, but we use the notation ofx to indicate the dependency of x onω. Letã Define∆ min
|μ a,n | .
We have 0 <∆ < 2M < ∞ almost surely since µ i (θ i ) = µ j (θ j ) for i = j and lim n→∞μa,n = µ a (θ a ) < ∞ almost surely for all a. In addition, there existsÑ ∈ N such that
For suchÑ , we have
Note thatã TS ,∆,M andÑ are determined only byω, regardless of T .
To argue by contradiction, supposeã
+2. Define the optimal solution to the inner problem of Irs.V-Zero:
where the ties are broken arbitrarily in argmax{}. Given Irs.V-Zero's selection rulẽ a
Case 1: Ifñ • (ã TS ) ≥Ñ , consider a deviation of pullingã TS one more time but pulling a
The allocationñ † 1:K achieves a strictly better payoff thanñ 
Case 2: Ifñ
By making this change,
, the last term is strictly positive, which means thatñ † 1:K is strictly better thanñ • 1:K . We got a contradiction. We've shown that for almost allω, when T is large enough, the optimal solutionñ • 1:K must impose more than a half of the pulls on the armã TS = argmax a µ a (θ a ). Therefore, lim T →∞ã • T =ã TS for almost allω, which completes the proof.
C.3. Proof of Theorem 2
The first inequality W TS (T, y) ≥ W Irs.FH (T, y) immediately follows from Jensen's inequality:
To show W Irs.FH (T, y) ≥ W Irs.V-Zero (T, y), we need to modify Jensen's inequality a bit. Lemma 1 (Variant of Jensen's inequality). Suppose ϕ : R → R is a non-decreasing (deterministic) function. Then, for any real-valued random variable X such that E|X| < ∞,
Proof. Define µ E(X) and f x (t) max{t + ϕ(x), 0}. Since f x (·) is a convex function for each
Note that, since 1{µ+ϕ(x) ≥ 0} is increasing in x, (i) for any x ≥ µ, (x−µ) ≥ 0 and 1{µ+ϕ(x)} ≥ 1{µ + ϕ(µ)}, and (ii) for any x < µ, (x − µ) < 0 and 1{µ
Combining with (86),
For random variable X, by taking expectation,
Corollary 1. On a probability space (Ω, F, P), suppose ϕ(x, ω) : R × Ω → R be a function such that (i) the mapping x → ϕ(x, ω) is non-decreasing for each ω ∈ Ω and (ii) for some sub-σ-field H ⊆ F, the mapping ω → ϕ(x, ω) is H-measurable for each x ∈ R (i.e., ϕ(·, ω) is a deterministic function conditioned on H). Then
Proof. Define
Following from (88), we have
Since µ(ω) and I(ω) are H-measurable,
Corollary 2. On a probability space (Ω, F, P), let (C 0 , · · · , C T ) be H-measurable realvalued random variables for some sub-σ-field H ⊆ F (i.e., C i 's are constants conditioned on H). Then
Proof. When n = T , both sides become E [max 0≤i≤T {C i }] which makes the claim true. Fix n < T and define
Note that ϕ(x, ω) satisfies the conditions in Corollary 1. Therefore,
= E max max
What we want to show is
Further define
Fix k and n. Define a sub-σ-field
For each i = 0, · · · , T , define
Note that C i 's are H-measurable and
With X µ k,T −1 , by Corollary 2,
C.4. Proof of Theorem 3 2017). For any
(1) Suboptimality analysis of TS (23). Define
where n π t−1 (a) n t−1 (a π 1:t−1 , a) represents how many times the policy π had pulled an arm a before time t. (L a,t , U a,t ) constructs the confidence interval on µ a (θ a ) (= θ a ) at time t and it is
Similarly, we have
We define an event E in which (L a,t , U a,t ) is indeed a valid confidence interval for every arm a at every time t:
Following from the above concentration inequalities, the sequence of confidence intervals fails to contain the true mean µ a (θ a ) with a very low probability:
With n = T − t, we can conclude that µ a * We consider relatively short time horizons (≤ T max = 200) since we focus on the finite horizon regime rather than asymptotic regime. Figure 2 shows the regrets (solid lines) and the regret bounds (dashed lines) of all algorithms being considered in our paper. In particular for this case where the state (belief) space is discrete and small in its size, O(T 4 ), we are able to solve Bellman equations (4) numerically that is shown with a curve labeled as Opt. Compared to Opt, we observe that all policies are nearly optimal. In Table 2 , even for TS that exhibits the worst performance, its regret differs only by 1.5 compared to Opt when T = 200, which means that it chooses the suboptimal arms only six times more than Opt does, in average.
Amongst IRS algorithms, we observe a clear improvement in both performances and bounds as we incorporate more complicated penalty functions from TS to Irs.V-EMax. As visualized in Figure 2 , the regret curve approaches to Opt from above and the bound curve approaches from below, which is consistent with the implication of Theorem 3. The strong duality states that, with ideal penalty, those two curves would meet at Opt, yielding zero suboptimality gap. However, we face a trade-off between the running time and the quality of policy/bound, as shown in Table 2 .
We finally remark the near-optimality of Irs.Index policy. It outperforms to all the other policies, surprisingly close to Opt. Despite that it is developed based on Irs.V-EMax, it performs better than Irs.V-EMax, which leaves a necessity of further studies. Table 2 : Summary statistics of the algorithms in Beta-Bernoulli MAB when K = 2 and T = 200. The last column shows the average time required to simulate one sample path throughout t = 1, · · · , T .
Ten arms (K = 10). We consider Beta-Bernoulli MAB with ten arms (K = 10) and Beta(1, 1) priors. Figure 3 and Table 3 show the results for the time horizons T ≤ T max = 500. We no longer have Irs.V-EMax and Opt because of the computation cost. Nevertheless, we still observe that IRS algorithms have a monotonicity in both performances and bounds, and Irs.Index policy performs best. 
D.3. Gaussian MAB
Two arms (K = 2). We consider a case such that
As shown in Figure 4 and Ten arms (K = 10). The results are provided in Figure 5 and Table 5 . Table 6 : Summary statistics of algorithms in Gaussian MAB when K = 5, T = 500 and σ 1:K = (0.1, 0.4, 1, 4, 10). Irs.Index* is a variant of Irs.Index introduced in §A.3.
